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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
a.

Nature of the Case.
This is an Appeal of the District Court's decision that an Idaho Transportation

Department Hearing Examiner had correctly determined that Mr. Hern had not met his
burden to demonstrate a basis existed under LC. § l 8-8002A(7) to set aside the
Department's Administrative License Suspension.

b.

Party References.
The Idaho Transportation Department is referred to as the "Department" for

purposes of this argument. Mr. Hem is specifically referred to by name. Where "driver"
is used, it is in reference to drivers generally.

c.

Reference to the Administrative Record.
The Transcript of the Department's Administrative Hearing is referred to as the

Clerk's Exhibit 1 Tr. by page and number. The Department's Administrative Record is
identified as Clerk's Exhibit 2 Record by page and number.

d.

Factual Statement and Procedural History.
On April 5, 2013 at approximately 2305 hours, Idaho State Patrol Trooper

Andrew Schoonmaker stopped a red Toyota Tacoma at 18 th and Main Street in Lewiston,
Idaho for an improper right turn (Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. p. 5).
The driver later identified as Gary Alexander Hern admitted to consuming alcohol
prior to driving. (Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. p. 5).
Mr. Hern performed standardized field sobriety evaluations and Mr. Hern failed
the evaluations (Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. p. 5).
Trooper Schoonmaker played the ALS advisory and conducted the 15 minute
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monitoring period before obtaining breath samples from Mr. Hern of .096 and .092.
(Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. p. 5).
Mr.

Hern timely requested a hearing with the

Idaho

Department of

Transportation's Hearing Examiner (Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. pp. 20-26) on the proposed
Administrative License Suspension resulting from the breath test failure.
A hearing was held telephonically on May 9, 2013 (Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. p. 71).
The Hearing Examiner entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
sustaining the Administrative Suspension of Mr. Hem's driving privileges on (Clerk's
Exhibit 2 R. pp. 118-139).
Mr. Hern timely filed a Petition for Judicial Review and the suspension was
stayed pending the Court's review (Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. pp. 140-142).
The District Court determined that Mr. Hern had not met his burden pursuant to
LC. § 18-8002A(7), affirming the decision of the Department's Hearing Examiner in its
Memorandum Opinion of June 20, 2014 (R. pp. 539-548).
Mr. Hern timely filed his Notice of Appeal of the District Court's decision and the
suspension of Mr. Hem's driving privileges has been stayed pending the Appeal.

II.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

Mr. Hern addresses three issues on appeal:
Issue 1: The validity of the Idaho State Police Standard Operating Procedures.
Issue 2: Due Process in the Administrative License Suspension Hearing process.
Issue 3: Were Mr. Hem's equal protection rights violated by the rulings of the
Department's Hearing Examiner?
Mr. Hern raises no challenge to the Hearing Examiner's decision that Mr. Hern
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has failed to meet his burden pursuant to LC. § l 8-8002A(7). Any issue which could
have been raised pursuant to J.C. § l 8-8002A(7) has been waived. Kugler v. Drowns,

119 Idaho 687,809 P.2d 1116 (1991), Wheeler v. IDHW, 147 ldaho 257,207 P.3d 988,
996 (2009).
There is no claim on appeal that the Department's Hearing Examiner abused his
discretion, was arbitrary or capricious or made a decision based on unlawful procedure or
exceed ITD's statutory authority, I.C. § 67-5279(3). Neither is there a claim that the
Hearing Examiner's decision was clearly erroneous.

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Idaho Code § l 8-8002A(7) sets out the burden of the driver to demonstrate to the
Hearing Officer that driving privileges should be reinstated because:
(a) The peace officer did not have legal cause to stop the person; or
(b) The officer did not have legal cause to believe the person had been
driving or was in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation
of the provisions of section 18-8004, l 8-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho
Code; or;
(c) The test results did not show an alcohol concentration or the presence
of drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation of section 188004, l 8-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code; or
(d) The tests for alcohol concentration, drugs or other intoxicating
substances administered at the direction of the peace officer were not
conducted in accordance with the requirements of section 18-8004(4 ),
Idaho Code, or the testing equipment was not functioning properly
when the test was administered; or
(e) The person was not informed of the consequences of submitting to
evidentiary testing as required in subsection (2) of this section.
The burden of proof rests on the driver to prove any of the grounds to vacate the
suspension of I.C. § l 8-8002A(7), Kane v. State, Dept. of Transp., 139 Idaho 586, 83

P.3d 130 at 143 (Ct. App. 2003).
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The review of disputed issues of fact must be confined to the agency record for
judicial review, I.C. § 67-5277.
Idaho Code § 67-5279(1) sets out the scope of review.

"The Court shall not

substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on
questions of fact." Howard v. Canyon County Bd. of Com 'rs, 128 Idaho 479, 9 I 5 P. 2d
709 (1996).
Idaho Code § 67-5279(3) provides:
When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter or by
other provision of law to issue an order, the court shall affirm the agency
action unless the court finds that the agency's findings, inferences,
conclusions or decisions are:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
made upon unlawful procedure;
not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

The appropriate remedy pursuant to the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act is:
" ... if the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in part and
remanded for further proceedings as necessary." Idaho Code § 67-5279(3).
The decision of the Transportation Department must be afiirmed unless the order
violates statutory or constitutional provisions, exceeds the agency's authority, is made
upon unlawful procedure, is not supported by substantial evidence or is arbitrary,
capricious or an abuse of discretion. Marshall v. Department of Transp., 13 7 Idaho 33 7,
48 P. 3d 666 (2002). The party challenging the agency decision must demonstrate that the
agency erred in a manner specified in Idaho Code § 67-5279(3) and that a substantial
right of that party has been prejudiced. Druffel v. State, Dept. ofTransp., 136 Idaho 853,
41 P.3d 739 (2002).
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Appellate review of the District Court's decision requires the Court to review
"the agency record independently of the District Court's decision", Marshall v. Dept. of
Transp. 137 Idaho 337, 340, 48 P.3d 666,669 (Ct. App. 2002).
IV.

ARGUMENT
ISSUE 1

The validity of the Idaho State Police Standard Operating Procedures.
Mr. Hem suggests without authority that the Appellate Court can determine that
Idaho's Breath Alcohol Testing Standard Operating Procedures (BATSOPs) adopted by
the Idaho State Police are invalid. Mr. Hern does so without asking the Court pursuant to
Idaho Code §67-5278 for a declaratory judgment of the validity of the Idaho State
Police's Breath Alcohol Standard Operating Procedures.
Mr. Hern did not name or include the Idaho State Police as a party to this Petition
for Judicial Review.
Mr. Hem's failure to name the Idaho State Police as a party to this action is
dispositive of any claim that the Court can consider the administrative action of the Idaho
State Police in adopting Idaho's BATSOP in this judicial review of the action of the
Department. Clearly, ISP must be a party for the Court to consider the action of ISP, "the
agency shall be made a party .... ", I.C. § 67-5278. 1

1 Simply naming the State of Idaho as a party is not sufficient. The State of Idaho operates an agency
model of administrative procedure, "agency means State Board, Commission, Department or Officer
authorized by law to make rules or determine contested cases ... " l.C. § 67-520 I (2).
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A collateral attack on the BATSOPs adopted by the Idaho State Police simply
cannot be made in the judicial review of the action of the Department of Transportation's
Hearing Examiner. 2
Since the Appellate Court reviews the decision of the Department's Hearing
Examiner on appeal independently of that of the District Court, Marshall, 133, 357, 340,
there is no basis for this Court to consider this argument based on the Record before the
Department's Hearing Examiner. 3
The only record for the Court's review should be the Idaho Transportation
Department's record of the Hearing Examiner's decision to suspend the driving
privileges of Mr. Hern, not a collection of various Idaho State Police documents and
correspondence apparently assembled by Mr. Hern, I.C. § 67-5275. This Court's judicial
review is appropriately limited to the Idaho Transportation Department's agency record,
I.C. § 67-5277.
Mr. Hern invites the review of Idaho's BATSOPs by submitting information
made available to Mr. Hern apparently based upon a request pursuant to the Idaho Public
Records Act of the Idaho State Police, not the record of the Idaho State Police's adoption

2

The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act permits the Court's review of an agency's decision.

Idaho Code§ 67-5270 provides:
( 1) Judicial review of agency action shall be governed by the provisions of this chapter unless other
provision of law is applicable to the particular matter.
(2) A person aggrieved by final agency action other than an order in a contested case is entitled to judicial
review under this chapter if the person complies with the requirements of sections 67-5271 through 675279, Idaho Code.
(3) A party aggrieved by a final order in a contested case decided by an agency other than the industrial
commission or the public utilities commission is entitled to judicial review under this chapter if the person
complies with the requirements of sections 67-5271 through 67-5279, Idaho Code. Emphasis added.
3 The District Court inappropriately "augmented" the agency record to permit Mr. Hem's collateral attack
on the action of the Idaho State Police (See R. pp. 260-261 ). The Department's Hearing Examiner did not
consider the argument now made by Mr. Hem.
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ofldaho's BATSOPs.
Mr. Hern does not tell the Court what weight to place on any of the documents
provided in the inappropriately augmented record or why the Court should conclude that
Idaho's BA TSOPs are invalid. Mr. Hern supplies the assembled information, asserting
that if the Court considers the information submitted, the Court would find that the
assembled information means that Idaho's BATSOPs are not valid. Mr. Hern does not
offer an affidavit, citation to scientific treatise, deposition or testimony of an expert (other
than counsel) for the Court to consider. 4
Mr. Hern offers no factual or legal basis for the challenge to the "science" of
Idaho's BATSOPs. 5

Mr. Hern cannot tell the Court what the Idaho State Police may have relied on in adopting Idaho's
BATSOPs and does not produce a record of the Idaho State Police's adoption of Idaho's BATSOPs. Mr.
Hern is responsible for the condition of the Record he has supplied the Court, In re Mahurin, 140 Idaho
656, 99 P.3d 125 (Ct. App. 2004).

4

Where an appellant fails to assert his assignments of error with particularity and to support his position
with sufficient authority, those assignments of error are too indefinite to be heard by the Court.
Randall v. Ganz, 96 Idaho 785, 788, 537, P.2d 65, 68 (1975). A general attack on the findings and
conclusions of the district court, without specific references to evidentiary or legal errors, is
insufficient to preserve an issue. Michael v. Zehm, 74 Idaho 442, 445, 263 P.2d 990, 993 (1953). This
Court will not search the record on appeal for error. Suits v. Idaho Bd. Of Prof'! Discipline, 138 Idaho
307, 400, 64 P.3d 323, 326 (2003). Consequently, to the extent that an assignment of error is not
argued and supported in compliance with the I.A.R., it is deemed to be waived. Suitts v. Nix, 141
Idaho 706, 708, 117 P.3d 120, 122 (2005).

Bettwieser v. New York Irrigation District, 154 Idaho 317,297 P.3d 311 (2013).
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Consistent with ISP's rule making authority, ISP has adopted by rule the
requirements for performing breath alcohol testing, ID APA 11.03.01.014. 6

6

014.

REQUIREMENTS FOR PERFORMING BREATH ALCOHOL TESTING.

01.
Instruments. Each breath testing instrument model shall be approved by the
department and shall be listed in the "Conforming Products List of Evidential Breath Measurement
Devices" published in the Federal Register by the United States Department of Transportation as
incorporated by reference in section 004 of this rule. ( 4-7-11)
02.
Report. Each direct breath testing instrument shall report alcohol concentration as
grams
of
alcohol
per
two
hundred
ten
(210)
liters
of
breath.
(7-1-93)
03.
Administration. Breath tests shall be administered in conformity with standards
established by the department. Standards shall be developed for each type of breath testing instrument
used in Idaho, and such standards shall be issued in the form of analytical methods and standard operating
procedures. (4-7-11)
04.
Training. Each individual operator shall demonstrate that he has sufficient training to
operate the instrument correctly. This shall be accomplished by successfully completing a training
course approved by the department. Officers must retrain periodically as required by the department.
(7-1-93)
05.
Checks. Each breath testing instrument shall be checked on a schedule
established by the Department for accuracy with a simulator solution provided by or approved by the
department. These checks shall be performed according to a procedure established by the department.
(4-7-11)
06.
Records. All records regarding maintenance and results shall be retained for three (3)
years.
(3-19-99)
07.
Deficiencies. Failure to meet any of the conditions listed in Sections 013 and 014. Any
laboratory or breath testing instrument may be disapproved for failure to meet one (I) or more of the
requirements listed in sections O13 and O14, and approval may be withheld until the deficiency is
corrected.
IDAPA I 1.03.01
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The Idaho State Police has adopted Idaho's BATSOPs consistent with the
authority found at IDAPA 11.03.01.014.03, as permitted by LC.§ 18-8004. These breath
testing standards are not adopted by the Idaho Transportation Department. 7
Further, judicial review is not available of the Idaho State Police's action m
adopting the BATSOPs as an operating procedure, IDAPA 11.03.01. 8
Mr. Hern cannot demonstrate based on this Record that the action of the Idaho
State Police is in any way deficient. Nor can Mr. Hern demonstrate that there is a basis
for the Court's review of the Idaho's BATSOPs in this judicial review of the decision of
the Department's Hearing Examiner.

7

1.C. § l 8-8002A(3) provides:
Rulemaking authority of the Idaho state police. The Idaho state police may, pursuant to chapter 52.
title 67, Idaho Code, prescribe by rule:
(a) What testing is required to complete evidentiary testing under this section; and
(b) What calibration or checking of testing equipment must be performed to comply with the
department's requirements. Any rules of the Idaho state police shall be in accordance with the
following: a test for alcohol concentration in breath as defined in section 18-8004, Idaho Code,
and subsection (I)( e) of this section will be valid for the purposes of this section if the breath
alcohol testing instrument was approved for testing by the Idaho state police in accordance with
section 18-8004, Idaho Code, at any time within ninety (90) days before the evidentiary testing. A
test for alcohol concentration in blood or urine as defined in section 18-8004, ldaho Code, that is
reported by the Idaho state police or by any laboratory approved by the Idaho state police to
perform this test will be valid for the purposes of this section. Emphasis added.

"There is no provision for administrative appeals before the Idaho State Police under this chapter."
IDAPA I 1.03.01.003
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The District Court correctly determined that ISP's rules at IDAPA 11.03.01.014
permitting the utilization of standard operating procedures to determine the appropriate
testing standards for each breath testing instrument was lawful.

Mr. Hern makes no

argument contending either that ISP's rules permitting the adoption of breath testing
standards as standard operating procedures were not properly adopted or that ISP's action
adopting Idaho's BATSOPs pursuant to IDAPA 11.03.01.014 was improper. 9
Mr. Hern simply argues that ISP should do something more or something
different than it has done.
The Court's discussion in Tomorrows Hope, Inc., v. IDHW, 124 Idaho 843, 864

P.2d 1130 (1993) may be helpful here. There the Court was attempting to determine
whether the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare's adoption of a policy interpretation
by manual was an interpretation of a statutory term or a regulatory term.
Mr. Hern does not argue that ISP has in some fashion changed or redefined the
original statutory directive by the adoption of standard operating procedures pursuant to
ISP' s rules. ISP may prescribe by rule what testing is required to complete evidentiary
testing and what calibrations must be performed to comply with ISP's requirements, I.C.
§ l 8-8002A(3 ). There is no requirement that breath testing instrument approval or that

laboratory approval by ISP must occur in some fashion other than what ISP has done.

10

ISP adopts by rule the authority to create standard operating procedures permitted
by LC.§ 67-5201(21).

9 A standard is a "manual guideline, curriculum, specification, requirement, measurement or other
administrative principle providing a model or pattern in comparison with which the correctness or
appropriateness of specified actions, practices or procedures may be determined," J.C. § 67-520 I (21 ).

10 Mr. Hem does not argue that ISP's breath testing SOP's are really rules which inappropriately interpret
J.C. § l 8-8002A(3).
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ISP is simply authorized to adopt breath testing procedures by rule. The choice of
the form of BATSOPs is clearly within the province of ISP. ISP is under no requirement
to do something else. 11
Mr. Hem asks that the Court consider a District Court's decision determining that
the State failed to meet its burden in a criminal case to properly lay a foundation for the
admissibility of a breath test, however, Mr. Hem does not provide any authority for such
an analysis in the Administrative License Suspension setting. Mr. Hern only argues that
the BATSOPs should not be used, not that they were not appropriately adopted. 12
ITD's Hearing Examiner appropriately relied on Idaho's current BATSOPs.

!TD has contemporaneously with the filing of this Brief, moved to strike Exhibits A, B, C & D attached
to Mr. Hem's Appellate Brief.
ITD's Hearing Examiner did not consider these exhibits in its
administrative hearing and the offered exhibits were not before the District Court. Without waiving the
objection to the Court's consideration of Exhibits A, B, C & D to Mr. Hem's Opening Brief, ISP's action
even if in response to a District Court decision was not an action taken by !TD, it's Hearing Examiner or its
Board. This argument is another indication of why the collateral attack on Idaho's BATSOPs is not
appropriate in this setting.
11

12

The Court of Appeals has rejected this argument:
Although Besaw has exposed some troubling information about the manner in which the SOPs for
breath testing have been developed or amended, we are not persuaded that he has demonstrated that the
SOP procedures are incapable of yielding accurate tests. Besaw contends that the SOPs are so strewn
with " weasel words" and " wiggle room" that they lack scientific basis and permit testing procedures
that will not yield accurate tests, but there is no evidence in the record to support that conclusion. To
be sure, the emails and memos to and from ISP personnel are disturbing, for some comments and
suggestions lacked any apparent regard for the way proposed changes could affect the validity of the
tests. As Besaw alleges, some participants seemed to view the ISP's task as being to thwart all possible
defense challenges to the admission of breath tests rather than to adopt standards that will maximize
the accuracy of tests upon which individuals may be convicted of serious crimes and deprived of their
liberty. Further, it appears that there was a conscious avoidance of any opportunity for suggestions or
critiques from persons outside the law enforcement community. While we do not endorse or condone
such an approach to the ISP's statutorily-assigned duty to define breath testing procedures and
standards, we cannot say that the emails in and of themselves, or any other evidence in the record,
establishes that the test procedures actually authorized by the SOPs and applied in Besaw's case are
incapable of producing reliable tests. Therefore, we find no error in the magistrate court's denial of
Besaw's motion to exclude the test results from evidence.

State v. Besaw, 155 Idaho 134, 306P.3d219 (Ct. App. 2013).
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ISSUE 2
Due Process in the Administrative License Suspension Hearing process.
Mr. Hern argues that his due process interest in his driving privileges was in some
fashion injured, damaged or affected by either the scheduling of the Administrative
License Suspension hearing by the Department's Hearing Examiner or the Hearing
Examiner's failure to issue subpoenas.

Mr. Hern offers no showing of an

unconstitutional deprivation by the Department's Hearing Examiner's scheduling of the
hearing or failure to issue subpoenas. Mr. Hern makes no showing of how he suffered
irreparable harm, let alone a demonstration of any harm. 13
The Notice of Hearing and the Department's Show Cause Letter were dated April
15, 2013, Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. pp. 93-94 setting the administrative license suspension
hearing for May 9, 2013. The thirty days of temporary driving privileges as provided in
the original Notice of Suspension issued April 6, 2014 ran on the 5 th of May, 2013,
Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. p. 1. 14
On May 10, 2013 the Department's Hearing Examiner stays the pending
suspension, stopping the withdrawal period effective May 6, 2013, Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. p.
62.

On May 24, 2013 the Department's Hearing Examiner entered Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law and Order, making the suspension effective May 31, 2013.
The Show Cause Letter clearly indicates that the scheduling of the hearing does
13 It is difficult to detennine whether Mr. Hem argues that he was denied due process or if the
Administrative License Suspension process is berift of due process. This Court has continually upheld the
Department's Administrative Licenses Suspension process as constitutional, see for example Bell v. Idaho
Transp. Dept., 151 ldaho 659,262 P.3d 1030 (Ct. of App.2011).
14 The Department issues what is termed a "show cause" letter contemporaneously with the Notice of
Hearing (Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. p. 93-94). The Title of the notice is unfortunate, however, Mr. Hem's show
cause letter does not require that Mr. Hern "show cause." Instead the letter notifies Mr. Hem that the date
of the hearing has been extended in this case to permit the receipt of subpoenaed evidence requested by Mr.
Hern and in spite of its title is clearly the Hearing Examiner's determination that good cause exists to
extend the hearing date to accommodate the requested discovery.
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not operate as a stay of the suspension. Mr. Hern was advised that temporary driving
privileges expire thirty days after the service of the Notice of Suspension. The Record
reflects that Mr. Hern did not make a request for a stay of the effective date of the
suspension pending the Hearing Examiner's decision, instead Mr. Hern objected to the
show cause letter, Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. pp. 63-64.
Mr. Hern claims that the four day suspension between May 6th and May 10th,
2013 results in a deprivation of a property right without due process which should then
result in a finding by the Court that the remaining 86 day suspension should be vacated
because the Department did not timely schedule the Administrative License Suspension
hearing within thirty days of the date of the Notice of Temporary Driving Privileges.
Mr. Hern does not indicate that he suffered any harm or consequence as a result of
the alleged four day suspension of his driving privileges, nor does Mr. Hern indicate that
the Hearing Examiner back dated the stay of the order suspending Mr. Hem's driving
privileges.
The Idaho Court has not yet dealt with a suspension entered after the expiration of
the thirty days of temporary driving privileges resulting in a deprivation sufficient to
consider setting aside the entire suspension entered by the Department's Hearing
Examiner.
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The four days at issue here is not a significant, substantial or erroneous
deprivation constituting a constitutionally cognizable harm requiring the Court to set
aside the entire suspension of Mr. Hem's driving privileges. 15
The United States Supreme Court in Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mallen. 486
U.S. 230, 242, 108 S.Ct. 1780, 1788-89, JOO L.Ed.2d 265, 279 (1988) analyzes the effect

of the delay of a decision dealing with the proposed suspension of a professional banking
license.
In Mallen, the Supreme Court inquired as to whether the proposed suspension
hearing provided a "prompt proceeding and a prompt disposition of the merits." The
Mallen Court specifically indicates that an unjustifiable delay in holding a hearing could

become a constitutional violation, however, the significance of such a delay cannot be
evaluated in a vacuum, 486 U.S. 241. "In determining how long a delay is justified in
affording a post suspension hearing and decision, it is appropriate to examine the
importance of the private interests and the harm to this interest occasioned by the delay"
486

us 242.
The apparent deprivation here is that Mr. Hern contends he did not have driving

privileges for four days, however, Mr. Hern makes no other showing of the harm as a
result of allegedly not having driving privileges for four days.
Since Mr. Hem does not ask this Court to review the Department's Hearing
Examiner's decision that Mr. Hem failed to meet his burden pursuant to LC. § 18-

15

However, an undue delay in holding a post-suspension hearing or issuing a decision may constitute a
deprivation of due process. Delays in administrative proceedings may not violate due process if the
person requesting the administrative proceeding contributed to the delay. (Citations omitted).

Bellv. Idaho Transp. Dep't, 151 Idaho 659,670,262 P.3d 1030, 1041 (Ct. App. 201 I).
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8002A(7), it is unlikely that the Hearing Examiner's decision can be set aside. When Mr.
Hern makes no attempt to demonstrate that he met his burden pursuant to the factors of
LC. § l 8-8002A, there can be no erroneous deprivation, Mallen, id.
There is no erroneous deprivation here because Mr. Hern does not challenge the
Hearing Examiner's findings as to the circumstances of the license suspension. Here, Mr.
Hern does not raise any of the LC. § 18-8002A(7) basis for setting aside the
Administrative License Suspension. None of the Hearing Examiner's findings pursuant
to LC. § l 8-8002A(7), for which Mr. Hern has the burden, were challenged before the
District Court or now in this appeal. Mr. Hern cannot therefore demonstrate that the
alleged four day suspension was erroneous.
Mr. Hern does not analyze either the Mathews factors or the factors set out in
Mallen for purposes of determining whether the alleged the four day suspension is a

constitutionally cognizable harm. 16
It is appropriate for the Hearing Examiner to ensure that Mr. Hern has the
discovery he requested prior to the Hearing. As the Court of Appeals cautioned in Bell v.
Idaho Transp. Dept. 151 Idaho 659, 262 P.3d 1030 (Ct. App. 2011), it is unreasonable to

expect that a driver could be sufficiently prepared for the Administrative License
Suspension hearing without the requested discovery information.
In a different setting, the Idaho Supreme Court has analyzed harm related to

16

Courts must consider three factors in procedural due process challenges: First, the private interest that will
be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18, 33 (1976).
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whether a party had standing and concluded that even the existence of a known or
anticipated injury may be "characterized as nonjusticiable because it is too remote to be
ripe for review on one hand, or too remote to constitute the requisite concrete harm to
satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of standing" (citations omitted) Boundary
Backpackers v. Boundary County, 128 Idaho 371 at 381, 913 P.2d 1141 (1996).

Here, Mr. Hern does not indicate that he suffered any actual harm or that there
was a violation of any fundamental right. 17
The Idaho Supreme Court in Boise Tower Associates, LLC v. Hogland, 147 Idaho
774, 215 P.3d 494, (2009) discussed the potential due process violation in the context of

a stop work order prohibiting further construction of a building in downtown Boise. The
Court indicates there that interim suspensions of licenses and temporary seizures of
property may be undertaken without a pre deprivation hearing provided there is a
sufficient factual basis for the action and that prompt administrative or judicial review of
the merits in the decision is available. There, the City's Building Official's decision to
issue a stop work order was merely a temporary suspension of the right to perform work
on the project.
In analyzing the nature of the impact on private interest of Boise Tower
Associates, the Idaho Court concluded that the effect was minor because the decision to

issue the stop work order was merely intermittent until a course of action could be agreed
upon by the parties.

Obviously the Boise Tower Associates suffered a potentially

substantial injury by not being able to proceed with construction without a finding of a
constitutional violation.

Mr. Hern on the other hand does not demonstrate that he

The Supreme Court also considers that the possible length of a wrongful deprivation of benefits is an
important factor in assessing the impact of the public action on the private interest, Mathews at p. 342.
17
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suffered any consequence as a result of the four day suspension, particularly when Mr.
Hern does not challenge the J.C. § 18-8002A(7) basis of the Hearing Examiner's
decision. 18
Clearly the potential impact of an alleged four day suspension of driving
privileges awaiting the determination of whether the driving privileges should be
suspended for 90 days is not an erroneous unconstitutional deprivation. Mr. Hern simply
asks the Court to set aside the entirety of the 90 day suspension because there was a four
day time frame in which Mr. Hern argues he did not have driving privileges in spite of
the Hearing Examiner staying the effective date of the suspension.
Further, the Hearing Examiner here did a commendable job in his findings. The
thoroughness and completeness of those findings are what the Mallen Court anticipates
will be made in an administrative hearing.

Here, in this administrative setting, the

Hearing Examiner extended to Mr. Hern the process due him in regards to his property
interest in his continued driving privileges.
Mr. Hern fails to tell the Court that he requested a stay verbally at the
Administrative Hearing held on May 9, 2013, Clerk's Exhibit I Tr. p. 42 LL.13-14. The
stay of the pending suspension was entered May 10, 2014 (Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. p. 62)
backdated to May 6, 2013 pending the decision of the Hearing Examiner.

18 Previously the Idaho Court has determined that Dennis McNeely's interest in driving privileges was not
so substantial as to require a pre suspension hearing, although the interest may be affected by the length of
the suspension period and the timeliness of a post suspension review proceeding, McNeely v. State, I 19
Idaho 182,804 P.2d911 (Ct. App. 1990).
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The Amended Stay Order was backdated so that Mr. Hem's suspension, if any,
would not be effective until the entry of the Hearing Examiner's decision. 19
Mr. Hem's argument concerning the potential unconstitutional deprivation by the
Hearing Examiner's scheduling of the Administrative License Suspension Hearing was
considered and thoroughly rejected by the Court of Appeals In re Beyer, 155 Idaho 40,
304 P. 1206 (Ct. App. 2013). 20

The constitutional issue characterized by Mr. Hern is apparently now that the
Department has responded to the Court of Appeals concern in Bell v. Idaho Transp.
Dept., that the Department waited too long after the receipt of the discovery requested by

Mr. Hem, to schedule the hearing, not that the hearing was scheduled too soon prior to
the receipt of discovery.
Clearly, "invited error" compels the same result as the Court of Appeals decision
in Beyer. Additionally, Mr. Hern simply makes an unsupported policy argument of the

19 The Hearing Examiner even gives Mr. Hem credit for the four day suspension, imposing an 86 days
suspension Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. p. 139, even though he had previously backdated the effectiveness of the
stay, Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. p. 62.

20

The doctrine of invited error applies to estop a party from asserting an error when his or her own
conduct induces the commission of the error. Thompson v. Olsen, 147 Idaho 99, 106, 205 P.3d 1235,
l 242 (2009). One may not complain of errors one has consented to or acquiesced in Id. In short,
invited errors are not reversible. Id. Thus, given that Beyer affirmatively accepted the Hearing
Examiner's remedy at the time of the hearing, even if the hearing officer erred by not requiring the
video to be produced until the day of the hearing, Beyer cannot complain of that error. 7
The Court continues in the footnote:
We have previously criticized a Hearing Examiner's practice of issuing subpoenas requiring
compliance on the day before the scheduled hearing. We stated that such a practice is "strongly
discouraged," but that it does not amount to a per se violation of procedural due process. Bell v.
Idaho Transp. Dept., 151 Idaho 659,666,262 P.3d 1030, 1037 (Ct. App. 2011). The ALS hearing
in this case was held prior to our decision in Bell but, here, compliance was ordered on the day of
the hearing. We continue to strongly discourage this practice. We see no reason for this practice
except to cause a disadvantage to the driver who has the burden of proof at the Administrative
License Suspension hearing, Beyer at p. 1213.
In re Beyer, 155 Idaho 40, 304 P.3d 1206 (Ct. App. 2013).
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worst of what could happen without demonstrating that he specifically suffered any loss,
injury, or consequence as a result of the scheduling of the hearing or the Hearing
Examiner's failure to issue subpoenas.
The District Court correctly analyzed the due process claim of Mr. Hem. Mr.
Hern was provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard, Aberdeen-Springfield
Canal Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 982 P.2d 917 (1999) and in a meaningful manner,
Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130 Idaho 923, 950 P.2d 1262 (1998).

There is no unconstitutional deprivation as a result of the process extended to Mr.
Hern. The suspension of Mr. Hem's driving privileges was stayed pending the decision
of the Department's Hearing Examiner. 21
Mr. Hern was afforded sufficient due process.
ISSUE 3
Were Mr. Hern 's equal protection rights violated by the rulings of the Department's
Hearing Examiner?

Mr. Hern contends that the Hearing Examiner's decision regarding the
scheduling of the hearing or the issuance of subpoenas violates Mr. Hem's equal
protection rights.

Mr. Hern does not contend that the Idaho Legislature created two

classes of individuals who are treated differently, only that he is treated differently from
drivers in an Administrative License Suspension hearing who do not request that the
Department's Hearing Examiner's issue subpoenas.
Mr. Hern must first identify the challenged classification, then determine the

The District Court appropriately observes that the Hearing Examiner's stay of the suspension was issued
May 10, 2013 Nunc Pro Tune to May 6, 20 I 3, further, eliminating potential harm to Mr. Hern. The
decision suspending Mr. Hem's driving privileges was effective on May 31, 2013 and the Petition for
Judicial Review was filed on May 30, 2013.
21

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

19

standard by which to review the classification, Tarbox v. Tax Com 'n, 107 Idaho 957, 959,
695 P.2d 342 (1984).

The third step is to determine whether the standard has been

satisfied, State v. Breed, 111 Idaho 497, 500, 725 P2d 202, 205 (1986).
Mr. Hem makes a "class of one" argument challenging being singled out based
upon "a distinction that fails the rational basis test where the challenged treatment does
not follow a suspect classification or punish the exercise of fundamental rights,"
Anderson v. Spalding, 137 Idaho 509, 50 P.3d 1004 (2002). Mr. Hern correctly identifies

the standard under which the classifications would be reviewed, but does not analyze the
standard.
As a result of the Idaho Court of Appeals analysis in Bell, the Department's
Hearing Examiner here did two things. The Hearing Examiner initially set the hearing
far enough in advance to ensure that the requested discovery was made available to Mr.
Hern based on his request for discovery (Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. p. 93-94). Secondly, the
Hearing Examiner at Mr. Hem's request entered a stay of the Administrative License
Suspension until the effective date of the Hearing Examiner's decision (Clerk's Exhibit 2
R. p. 62).

Mr. Hem does not provide any facts about the nature of the subpoenas requested
or refused. The Hearing Examiner did issue some subpoenas, however, Mr. Hern does
not show how the denial of the issuance of other subpoenas limited his ability to meet his
burden as required by I.C. § 18-8002A(7).
Mr. Hem has the burden of demonstrating that an unconstitutional deprivation
occurred, State v. Rhoades, 121 Idaho 63, 822 P.2d 960 (1991). Just as Mr. Hern fails to
meet his burden pursuant to I.C. § 18-8002A(7), Mr. Hem fails to meet his burden to
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demonstrate that an unconstitutional deprivation of Mr. Hern' s equal protection occurred.
Mr. Hern does not identify any fundamental right or identify any suspect
classifications based on drivers who request the Hearing Examiner to issue subpoenas
and those that do not. There is no showing that the Department's Hearing Examiner
unduly burdened the exercise of a fundamental right for equal protection purposes or that
a suspect classification exists which includes drivers who do discovery or request the
issuance of administrative subpoenas.
The application of the equal protection clause only requires that the classification
to the extent that a classification exists, rationally furthers a legitimate state interest,
Anderson, 519.

The Department's interest in complying with the Court of Appeals

decision in Bell v. Idaho Transp. Dept. is clearly a legitimate state interest.
Further, Mr. Hern is apparently suggesting that the Department's Hearing
Examiner should not consider a driver's discovery request and a request for the issuance
of subpoenas when scheduling an Administrative License Suspension hearing. Such a
result would be an intrusion into the administrative process that would be wholly
inappropriate, Anderson, 520.

The Hearing Examiner appropriately scheduled the

administrative hearing.
Mr. Hern does not meet his burden to demonstrate either that he is a legitimate
class of one or that any suspect classification exists. Mr. Hem's equal protection interests
are not in play and were not affected by the Hearing Examiner's decision in scheduling
the Administrative License Suspension hearing or in the denial of the issuance of
subpoenas.
Finally, Mr. Hem's claim is disposed of by the Court of Appeals "invited error"
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analysis in Beyer, infra.
The judicial review of the department's Hearing Examiner's decision suspending
Mr. Hem's driving privileges is not the place to challenge Idaho's BATSOPs.
The Hearing Examiner's decision is not arbitrary or capricious and is supported
by a sufficient record.

V.

CONCLUSION

Failing to challenge the Department's Hearing Examiner's decision pursuant to
I.C. § 18-8002A(7) and failing to demonstrate that the Hearing Examiner's Decision was
arbitrary or capricious or that the Hearing Examiner's Decision was not supported by
substantial evidence in the Record eliminates the availability of any relief to Mr. Hern.
Mr. Hern suffered no constitutionally cognizable harm and such process and equal
protection due him was provided.
The Hearing Examiner's decision to suspend Mr. Hem's driving privileges should
be sustained and Mr. Hem's driving privileges should be suspended for eighty six days.
DATED this _ _ day of January, 2015.
Edwin L. Litteneker
Special Deputy Attorney General
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I DO HEREBY CERTIFY that a true
And correct copy of the foregoing
Document was:
_ _ Mailed by regular first class mail,
And deposited in the United States
Post Office
_ _ Sent by facsimile and mailed by
Regular first class mail, and
Deposited in the United States
Post Office
_ _ Sent by Federal Express, overnight
Delivery
Hand delivered
To:
Charles M. Stroschein
Clark and Feeney
PO Drawer 285
1229 Main Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
On this _ _ day of January, 2015.
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